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I. INTRODUCTION
R ecently an Ad Hoc Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York wrote: "No single issue of corporate behavior has
engendered in recent times as much discussion in the United States-both
in the private and public arenas-and as much administrative and legis-
lative activity, as payments made abroad by corporations."'
Although payments by such corporate giants as Lockheed, 2 Exxon, 3
and Northrop4 have received the most extensive press coverage, the
practice has not been confined to the giants alone. More than 400 corpo-
rations, over 117 of them in the top Fortune 500, have admitted making
questionable or illegal payments. 5 In total, these corporate payments
have exceeded 300 million dollars. 6 Among other things, their disclosure
has forced the removal of a Central American president,7 embarrassed a
Philippine regime, 8 led to a constitutional crisis in the Netherlands, 9
caused legislative paralysis in Japan, 10 and shaken an Italian govern-
ment. 11 In the United States, questions over the propriety of foreign
payments recently delayed the confirmation of the chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. 12
Responding to such revelations, Congress recently enacted the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 prohibiting corporations from
making
use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value
to-
1. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on Questionable Foreign Payments
by Corporations: The Problem and Approaches to a Solution 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Report
of the Bar of the City of New York]. Questionable payments provided a "rich source of new
business" for Wall Street lawyers. Bernstein, The Wall Street Lawyers Are Thriving on Change,
Fortune, Mar. 13, 1978, at 107. The complexities of the issues have occasionally driven the legal
fees in excess of the questionable payments. See id.
2. See, e.g., Lindsey, A Bribery Scandal-The Give and the Take, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1977,
§ 3, at 1, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1974, at 6, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Jensen, U.S. Company Payoffs: Way of Life Overseas, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1975,
at 1, col. 1.
5. House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of
1977, H.R. Rep. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
6. Id.
7. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
8. Id., Jan. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
9. See id., Feb. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
10. Id., Apr. 19, 1976,'at 15, col. 1.
11. Id., Apr. 23, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
12. Id., Feb. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The Senate, howver, ultimately confirmed G.
William Miller with only one dissenting voice. Id., Mar. 4, 1978, at 27, col. 3.
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(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity
... or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality,
in order to assist [such corporation] in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person .... 13
The statute defines "foreign official" as "any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality." 4 The term does
not include "any employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial
or clerical."' s
Corporations violating the new statute face a possible fine of up to
one million dollars16-- one of the stiffest in the United States Criminal
Code. By requiring that the payments be made to foreign officials for
13. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 104, 91 Stat. 1496 (1977) (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Corrupt Practices Act]. The
legislation amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to forbid "issuers" from making these
payments and then enacts new legislation prohibiting "domestic concerns" (non-issuers) from
making such payments. The definition of "domestic concern" includes individuals, however.
Questionable foreign payments by corporations might be broken down into four distinct catego-
ries: (a) the outright bribe-a payment used to influence an official's discretionary act, or to
encourage an official to do an unlawful act; (b) a "grease" payment-a payment made to ensure
that an official will perform a nondiscretionary act or perform it within a reasonable time; (c) the
goodwill payment-a payment made with no specific policy decision in mind, but to assure a
reservoir of benevolence vis-i-vis the company at some future time; and (d) a political
contribution-a variety of goodwill payment-made to a political candidate or party. Often,
however, payments cannot be neatly fit into one or another of the four categories. If a company
knows, for example, that a new contract with a particular government may be in the offing,
would a payment to the government official in charge of deciding who receives government
contracts be a goodwill payment or a form of bribe? Since nothing is being asked in return for the
money, it could be viewed as a goodwill payment. Yet it is so closely connected to an upcoming
discretionary policy decision that it has the overtones of a bribe.
The new legislation criminalizes the bribe and the political contribution but does not
criminalize the "grease" payment. As for the goodwill payment, it would seem that the legislation
can be read as criminalizing this form of payment. The goodwill payment is made to influence
future acts of the government. The quid pro quo, although deferred, is still expected to be given.
The proposed revision of the United States Criminal Code would no longer include "corruptly"
as a culpable state of mind. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301, at 32 (1978). Foreign
corporate payments apparently would be criminalized under § 1351(a) of the revised Code
because the definition of public servant seems to include an official of a foreign government. See
id. § 111, at 14 ("public servant" and "government").
14. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, § 30A(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(l)b)).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 104(b)(1)(A) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(2)(b)(l(A))•
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the purpose of obtaining business, and by excluding clerical employees
of a foreign government from the definition of "foreign official," Con-
gress intended to distinguish between outright bribes-payments
which cause an official to exercise other than his free will in acting
or in making a decision-and so-called "facilitating" or "grease"
payments-payments which merely move a particular matter toward
an eventual act or decision, or which do not involve any discretionary
action. 17 In criminalizing the bribe but not the "grease" payment,
Congress has seemingly made a limited accommodation to the realities
of foreign business practices. But Congress refused to make any fur-
ther accommodations, criminalizing all payments whose purpose was
to influence discretionary governmental action whenever and wher-
ever made. This Article will argue that because of the structural differ-
ences among legal systems, the broad based criminalization approach
adopted by Congress may not be well advised.
"May not be well advised" is used because this Article does not
attempt to deal with all of the policy reasons supporting criminaliza-
tion of questionable payments. For example, moral or foreign policy
considerations might tip the balance in favor of criminalization. This
Article argues only that from the perspective of a comparative legal
systems analysis, criminalization does not appear to be the wisest
course.
In order to develop the argument against criminalization, Part II of
this Article will first suggest a structural model of the American legal
system-i.e. that of a legal system where governmental power,
whether executive or legislative, is not absolute, and where both an
independent judiciary with the power of judicial review and constitu-
tional protections exist to curb any arbitrary or capricious exercise of
that governmental power.' 8 The Article will then argue that this
structural model is not necessarily present in other legal systems.
Because of these structural dissimilarities among legal systems, this
Article will suggest that criminalizing questionable payments may be
an unwise course of action for two reasons. First, the structural differ-
ences among legal systems will make it more difficult to prove that
payments are "corruptly" made. Second, questionable payments may
represent a form of compensating mechanism for the lack of strong
judicial and constitutional protections in certain legal systems whose
structural model is different from that of the United States. 19
17. See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Foreign Corrupt Practices
and Domestic and Foreign Investment Improper Disclosure Acts of 1977, S. Rep. No. 114, 95th
Cong. 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6306 (hereinafter cited as
Senate Report].
18. See pt. II(A) infra.
19. See pt. II(B) infra.
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Part III of the Article will then turn to an analysis of other American
legislation which has an impact on the question of foreign corporate
payments.20 It will suggest that the lessons learned from the compara-
tive legal systems analysis in Part II may also be valuable in determin-
ing the manner in which these other statutes should be enforced.
II. A COMPARISON OF LEGAL SYSTEM MODELS
At the outset the reader is asked to accept the following model of the
American legal system. It is a legal system where neither the executive
nor the legislative branches of government are autonomous; 2' it is a
legal system where an independent judiciary with the power of judicial
review exists;22 and it is a legal system where there are meaningful
constitutional protections against arbitrary government action. 23
In such a system, the courts and constitution require the executive
and legislative branches of government to make principled (i.e. non-
arbitrary) decisions with respect to the foreign investor. Thus, in the
American model, criminalizing questionable payments to government
officials can be justified. Where structural mechanisms (i.e. the courts
and a constitution) restrict the government from acting arbitrarily or
capriciously, the payment will be more likely to be "corruptly" made-
that is, made with the specific intent to influence the government to
select from among a range of discretionary but reasonable alternatives,
the one most advantageous to the investor. 24 But it is necessary to
compare the model of the American legal system with those in other
areas of the world to see first, whether there are significant variants in
structure among legal systems and second, if there are, how these
20. See pt. III infra.
21. For example, the President can veto an act of Congress but the veto can be overridden by
a two-thirds vote of both Houses. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. c. 2.
22. Article III of the Constitution of the United States establishes a federal judiciary separate
and apart from the legislative and executive branches. U.S. Const. art. III. Although federal
judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, they hold office
during good behavior and can only be removed by impeachment. They are thus afforded a large
measure of independence from the other branches of government. On the federal courts' power of
judicial review of the acts of the legislature, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. t Cranch) 137
(1803), and on the executive, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Similar protections
giving the state judiciary independence can be found in various state constitutions.
23. For example, the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States states: -INlor
[shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. See
also U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
24. For a discussion of the degree of culpability needed for proving that a payment of money
was "corruptly" made under the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (1970, see United
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71-73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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variants impact on the question of whether to criminalize questionable
payments.
A. Structural Differences
It is, of course, impossible in an Article of this limited length to
compare the American model with all other existing legal models.
Consequently, it will be necessary to focus the analysis on one legal
model to the exclusion of others. The civil law models of Europe or
Latin America or the Japanese legal model would have provided
fruitful fields for comparison-particularly in light of the reported
payments made in these areas. 25 The author, however, has selected the
Middle East legal model as his focus, chiefly for three reasons. First, in
recent decades the Middle East has become an increasingly important
area of the world, both politically and financially. Second, the most
cursory glance reveals that Middle Eastern culture and legal traditions
are markedly dissimilar from our own, thus giving a sharper focus to
the comparative analysis. Third, although by no means the only part
of the world where questionable payments have been reported, these
payments do not seem to have been an uncommon phenomenon in the
area.26 In comparing the structure of the American legal model with
that of the Middle East, however, one caveat must be kept in mind.
By analyzing as a whole one legal tradition which covers so vast a
geographic area and so many different countries, 27 the reader must be
aware that some over-generalization is inevitable. What may be true in
Saudi Arabia may be more or less true in Egypt or Iran. The purpose
of the analysis is not to show the precise differences between the
American legal system and the legal system of any one Middle Eastern
country; rather it is to show that, in its most general structure, the
Middle Eastern legal model appears significantly different in relevant
respects from our own.
1. Executive Autonomy
The first constitutive element of the American model relates to the
power of the legislative and executive branches of the government. In
25. See notes 7, 9-11 supra. For a discussion of questionable payments made in Chile and
Colombia, see Report to the Shareholders of the General Tire Company, July 19, 1977, at 4 and
Time, Feb. 23, 1976, at 28. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 5; id., Mar. 3, 1977, at
46, col. 5.
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 2; Wash. Post, July 20, 1977, § D,
at 7, col. 1. See also Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings
before the Subcomnn. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 848-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Subcommittee Hearings .
27. For an acceptable definition of the Middle East, see R. Patai, The Arab Mind 10-11
(1973).
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the American system, neither the executive nor the legislature has
absolute power. In the Muslim legal tradition, however, the opposite is
more nearly correct. Although the Muslim ruler was theoretically
bound by the Sharia, or sacred law of Islam, in practice the Sharia
seems to have made him virtually autonomous: first by accepting de
facto political power as de jure political power, and second by reject-
ing the right of the community to revolt against anyone who holds
political power. Although the subject is a vast and complicated one,
some brief discussion must necessarily be given to each of these sepa-
rate points.
a. The Legitimacy of Acquiring Power
In the United States, for almost two hundred years, political power
has been transferred pursuant to constitutional mandate. The legiti-
macy of any American government can always be tested by these
fundamental constitutional principles. Islam, however, never stressed
one particular form or method of transferring power. In classical
Islamic legal theory, the Caliph or successor of the Prophet of God was
the chief executive officer of the Islamic community. 28 To him was
entrusted the defense and maintenance of the Sharia29 and from him
was delegated power to govern the various regions of Islam.30 The
Koran, however, did not specify how the Caliphate was to be acquired
or transferred. Mohammed himself did not address the question-in
fact, he did not even appoint a successor. The first Caliph, Abu Bakr,
was chosen in the traditional fashion of an Arab chieftain-election by
the leading men of the community. 31 Before he died, however, Abu
Bakr appointed a successor, Umar, as the second Caliph. 32 In his turn,
Umar refused to appoint a successor in the manner of Mohammed and
Uthman was elected.33 All, the fourth Caliph, was also elected4 but
his successor Mu'awiyah took the office by force of arms. 35 Although
28. 1 H. Gibb & H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West 30 (1957). The term "Caliph"
comes from the Arabic khalifa meaning deputy or representative. A. Guillaume, Islam 79 (1954)
On the development and history of the Caliphate, see T. Arnold, The Caliphate (1965).
29. 1 Gibb & Bowen, supra note 28, at 27.
30. See id. at 28.
31. Arnold, supra note 28, at 19-20.
32. Id. at 20. Because of Abu Bakr's age, Umar had been the virtual ruler even while his
predecessor was alive. Id.
33. E. Calverley, Islam: An Introduction 38 (1974). As he lay dying, Umar allegedly refused
to select his successor. Others suggest, however, that he appointed a body of sbx electors to choose
the next Caliph. Arnold, supra note 28, at 21.
34. Calverley, supra note 33, at 38.
35. Id. at 39, 43. In 676 Mu'awiyah, like Abu Bakr, nominated a successor, but introduced a
new element into the process of nomination. Mu'awiyah nominated his son Yazid to be the next
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some could argue from these examples that elective leadership was the
precedent adopted by Islam, 36 it seems to have been honored as much
in the breach as in the observance. Thus, in the early period of Islam,
election, nomination, and usurpation all seemed to have been accepted
as methods of achieving the Caliphate. The legitimacy of a claimant
was not judged so much by the manner of his achieving power as by
the fact that he had achieved power.
By the end of the eleventh century, the religious institution of the
Caliphate had lost power to the temporal institution of the Sultanate. 37
Although, at first, Sultans were technically designated by the Caliph,
in time even this sham was omitted, the Sultans no longer recognizing
the theoretical sovereignty of the Caliph. 38 As with the Caliphate
before, however, whoever was successful in acquiring the Sultanate
was recognized as the legitimate ruler. One Muslim jurist graphically
illustrated this principle when he remarked: "The sovereign has a right
to govern until another and stronger one shall oust him from power
and rule in his stead." 39 One modern commentator expressed the point
this way: "Muslim society . . . fatalistically disclaimed responsibility
for government and failed to establish in the name of the Shari'ah an
airtight guarantee of individual and community rights against arbi-
trary authority. '40
b. Support for the Existing Ruler
If Islam did not judge the legitimacy of how a ruler acquired power,
it did counsel support of that ruler once he had obtained power. In
Surah 4, verse 59, the Koran says: "Obey Allah, and obey the mes-
senger and those of you who are in authority . . . . ,4 Mohammed
went one step further when he advised Muslims to "endure patiently"
even the yoke of an evil leader. 42 Centuries later the theologian Ghaz-
Caliph, creating the first family dynasty (The Umayyads) in Islam. Id. at 43. See also Arnold,
supra note 28, at 22-23.
36. Sir Thomas Arnold in his book on the Caliphate suggests that some form of election was
involved in the case of each of the first four Caliphs-even in the case of Abu Bakr's appointment
of Umar. See Arnold, supra note 28, at 21-22.
37. The Legacy of Islam 414-15 (J. Schacht & C. Bosworth eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Schacht & Bosworth).
38. See 1 Gibb & Bowen, supra note 28, at 31-32. See also Schacht & Bosworth, supra note
37, at 412-15.
39. Schacht & Bosworth, supra note 37, at 415 (quoting Ibn Jama'a, a qadi of Damascus).
40. Nolte, The Rule of Law in the Arab Middle East. 48 Muslim World 295, 303 (1958).
41. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran 85, Surah IV, v. 54 (M. Pickthall trans. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as Koran].
42. The remark of the Prophet was reported by Abu Yusuf. See Gibb & Bowen, supra note
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zali would say: "An evil-doing and barbarous Sultan . . . must be
obeyed."'43 If Islam counselled submission to authority whether that
authority was good or evil, it follows that Islam would reject the right
of the community to revolt against that authority. Revolution broke
the unity of Islam and therefore had to be avoided at all costs. An
early exposition of the Sunni creed spoke quite clearly to this point:
We uphold the prayer for peace for the Imams of the Muslims and submission to their
office, and we maintain the error of those who hold it right to rise against them
whensoever there may be apparent in them a falling-away from right. We are opposed
to armed rebellion against them and civil war.
4 4
"Sixty years of tyranny ... are better than one hour of civil strife,"45
went the Arab maxim. In Islam, subservience to the wishes of the ruler
was viewed as a virtue and not as a vice. Thus, in contradistinction to
the American model, the Muslim legal model places a heavier em-
phasis on the autonomy of the political ruler.46
2. Constitutional Restraints
As its second constitutive element, the American model places def-
inite limits on the exercise of executive and legislative power by
constitutional guarantees. For example, the due process clause of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and the fifth amendment guarantee that just
compensation be paid for property taken for a governmental purpose,
all limit the acceptable range of governmental decision-making. In the
classical Muslim legal model, there also existed limitations on the
power of the ruler.
In the Arab Middle East, Islam is, of course, the dominant religion.
The basic text of Islam is the Koran. To a Muslim, the Koran is the
immutable word of God and its prescriptions cannot be disobeyed
either by the ruler or his subjects. The Koran prescribes rules of
28, at 28. Mohammed also was alleged to have required obedience to the ruler in quite graphic
terms. "0 men, obey God, even though He sat over you as your ruler a mutilated Abyssinian
slave." Arnold, supra note 28, at 49. For other hadith, or sayings, of the Prophet counseling
obedience to rules, see id. at 48-50.
43. Anderson & Coulson, The Moslem Ruler and Contractual Obligations, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
917, 931 (1958).
44. 1 Gibb & Bowen, supra note 28, at 28 n.3.
45. Anderson & Coulson, supra note 43, at 931.
46. In speaking of the history of Egypt, one commentator described the importance of the
ruler as follows: "Throughout Egypt's history political power and government functioning have
been characterized by personality-oriented executive control, whether by a pharaoh, caliph, khedive,
king, or presidenL" R. Nyrop, B. Benderly, W. Cover, D. Eglin & R. Kirchner, Area Handbook
for Egypt 184-85 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Area Handbook for Egypt].
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conduct for such matters as marriage, 47 divorce, 48 inheritance, 49 the
treatment of orphans,50 and the punishment of crimes.5 1 Similarly, the
Koran exhorts Muslims to act justly and honestly and to live up to
their contracts.5 2 Because the Koran set forth fundamental and
changeless principles, as to matters covered by its text, the Koran
acted as a form of constitution, limiting the exercise of the ruler's
power. But the Koran was not overly specific on most issues and other
legal principles developed to supplement its provisions. The sunna, or
practice of the prophet, ijma, or the consensus of Muslim religious
scholars, and qiyas or analogical reasoning provided the sources for
these supplementary legal rules.5 3 As one scholar has remarked, these
rules of the Sharia "generally imposed a restraint upon the ruler
through his own piety or through his political prudence during an era
when the qadis and jurisconsults wielded an enormous popular pres-
tige . . . . ,,54 But as has been pointed out above, just as the Sharia
imposed certain restrictions on the ruler, it also counselled his subjects
to tolerate him even when he acted against the tenets of the law. Thus,
in the classical Muslim model, there developed what has been termed
"a qualified rule of law,"55 resulting in a system in which the ruler
appears less clearly restricted in the exercise of his authority than in
the American model.
But perhaps it is inaccurate to compare the American constitutional
model with the classical Muslim model because, during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the Middle East has undergone a process of
Westernization.5 6 In the process many Middle Eastern nations have
adopted Western-styled constitutions which contain precise textual
guarantees against arbitrary governmental action. For example, in 1971,
Egypt enacted a new constitution.5 7 Freedom of religion and the press
were guaranteed.5 8 Every Egyptian was considered to be equal before the
47. See, e.g., Koran, supra note 41, at 81-82, Surah IV, vv. 22-25 (listing forbidden degrees
of marriage).
48. Id. at 54, Surah II, vv. 230-32. But see the hadith of Mohammed: "The thing which Is
lawful, but disliked by Allah, is divorce." I. Kashmiri, Prophet of Islam: Muhammad and Some
of His Traditions 91 (1967).
49. Koran, supra note 41, at 80, Surah IV, vv. 11-12.
50. Id. at 79-80, Surah IV, vv. 6-10.
51. Id. at 100, Surah V, v. 38; id. at 253, Surah XXIV, v. 2.
52. See, e.g., id. at 59-62, Surah II, vv. 282-86; id. at 83, 93, Surah IV, v. 33.
53. For a brief discussion of these sources of classical Islamic law, see 1 M. Khadduri & H.
Liebesny, Law in the Middle East 90-97 (1955).
54. Nolte, supra note 40, at 303.
55. Id.
56. For a brief study of this process of Westernization, see Bonderman, Modernization and
Changing Perceptions of Islamic Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1169 (1968).
57. For the full text of the Egyptian Constitution, see 26 Middle East J. 55 (1972).
58. Id.
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law.5 9 Arrest and seizure without court order were outlawed. 60 More
importantly, for the purposes of this Article, article 35 of the 1971
constitution prohibited property nationalization except when dictated by
the public interest and then only when compensated. 61 Textually, the
Constitution of Egypt is perhaps more libertarian than the Constitution
of the United States.
But on closer analysis this process of Westernization, of formally
changing the structure of Middle Eastern legal systems to conform to
Western models, may have had the unintended effect of making the two
models (the American and the Muslim) less, rather than more, similar. As
Richard Nolte has pointed out: "By thrusting the Shari'ah far into the
background, the influence of secular conceptions from the West has
mostly dissolved the qualified rule of law imposed during the centuries of
classical Islam. Never fully controlled, the ruler now appears to be fully
uncontrolled from a Shari'ah point of view." 62 Although weakening the
traditional legal restraints, Western constitutional norms have not had
time to take root, or to replace the older restraints with a new set of legal
restraints on the power of the ruler. 63 For example, the American Con-
stitution has lasted 195 years. The present Egyptian Constitution has
been in effect only since 1971, and the previous constitution of Egypt-
the Constitution of 1964-lasted only 7 years. 64 Although age is not a
criterion for fairness or effectiveness, it may indicate that a country has
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Significantly, however, the Constitution does not qualify the word compensation with
any adjective like "just" or the like. For reference to the compensation paid foreign interests
during the Nassar expropriations, see Doherty, Rhetoric and Reality: A Study of Contemporary
Official Egyptian Attitudes Toward the International Legal Order, 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 335, 349
nn.95 & 96 (1968). Egypt seems to maintain that a state may nationalize foreign assets upon
payment of adequate compensation. Foreign investments under Egypt's new open-door policy are
immune from nationalization. Law No. 43 of 1974 Concerning The Investment of Arab and
Foreign Funds and the Free Zones art. 7 (Egypt), as amended by Law No. 32 of 1977 (Egypt)
[hereinafter cited as Law No. 431 (copy on file with the Fordham Lau, Review). Assets of such
projects can be confiscated only pursuant to judicial procedures. Id. Law No. 43, however,
makes no reference to compensation after confiscation. Prior investment laws did make such
references. See Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment: The Framework for Economic
Openness, 9 Int'l Law. 647, 653 (1975).
62. Nolte, supra note 40, at 307. See also N. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic
Jurisprudence 69 (1969).
63. Nolte, supra note 40, at 307.
64. Area Handbook for Egypt, supra note 46, at 166. The first written Egyptian constitution
was promulgated in 1923 but was suspended during 1928 and 1929. Id. at 164. From October of
1930 to December of 1935, a substitute constitution was in effect. The Constitution of 1923 was
fully abrogated in 1952 and a new constitution was promulgated in 1953. Id. at 164-65. In 1959,
because of the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic, yet another constitution
was adopted. When that union failed, a National Charter was promulgated in Egypt in 1962,
which lasted for two years. Id. at 166.
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come to view its constitution more as a fundamental and rarely changed
document than as an ordinary piece of legislation. Thus, Westernization
has, on the one hand, weakened the traditional restraints on the ruler's
power and, on the other, has as yet failed to substitute a new set of
restraints in their place. The effect of this process can only be a net gain
for the ruler. Thus, the ruler, already stronger in the Muslim legal model
than in the American model, may have become stronger still due to the
process of Westernization, with its concomitant weakening of traditional
values.
3. The Judiciary
The final element of the American model to be discussed is an indepen-
dent judiciary with the power of judicial review. Although the system of
checks and balances provides the other branches of government with
some control over the American judiciary, by and large the judiciary is
free of direct political control. 65 More importantly for this discussion,
however, the courts have asserted the right to review the acts of the other
branches of government-to test their actions against the guarantees
provided in the Constitution. Thus, along with the Constitution, the
American judiciary provides a brake on capricious governmental action.
On the question of an independent judiciary with the power of judicial
review, the Islamic model differs in significant respects from the Amer-
ican model. The first important difference, however, is perhaps cultural
rather than legal. Every society must provide a mechanism for dispute
resolution. In the United States that function is performed primarily by
the courts. In the Arab tradition, tribal or village mediation has for
centuries been the prime method for settling disputes. 66 This process of
mediation has as its primary purpose the reconciliation of the parties,
not the determination of who is right or wrong or who has the superior
claim. 67 While the verdict of a court formally ends the dispute in the
eyes of society, it often fails to resolve the hostility between the
disputants. As a consequence, research has disclosed that in the
Middle East there is "resistance to the use of courts."'68 Thus, culturally,
the courts in the Middle East seem to provide a less important
mechanism for dispute resolution than in the United States. Tradi-
tional forms of mediation or conciliation are preferred.
65. The United States Constitution may, however, permit some degree of congressional
control over the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. I1, §
2; see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869). But see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605
n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66. Patai, supra note 27, at 228.
67. Id. at 231.
68. Id.
1082 [Vol. 46
QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS
Any discussion of the second important difference between the
American and Muslim judicial models requires a general understand-
ing of the traditions out of which the Muslim system grew. To focus
the discussion, the legal traditions which have molded the contempo-
rary Egyptian legal system will be briefly considered. The British, the
French, and the traditional Muslim legal traditions have all contrib-
uted strongly to the philosophy and structure of the contemporary
Egyptian judiciary. The three traditions will be treated in historical
order and the Islamic tradition, being the oldest, will be considered
first.69
a. The Islamic Tradition
In classical Islamic jurisprudence, the qadi, or Islamic judge, was
not independent from the one who appointed him.70 Thus, since the
Caliph, and later the Sultan, was the supreme power in the Muslim
state, all qadis ultimately owed their position to the ruler through a
complex process of subdelegation of that supreme power. 7 1 In the
Ottoman judicial system for instance, the ruler appointed two chief
judges or qadi askers-one as chief judge of Rumelia (Europe) and one
as chief judge of Anatolia (Asia).7 2 Below the chief judges were vary-
ing grades and degrees of judges. In the European half of the judiciary
there were, for example, nine such grades. 7" Each one of these inferior
judges was technically appointed by the Sultan (usually for a price)
and served at his pleasure. 74
Appointment as a qadi brought with it jurisdiction to hear cases.
But whoever appointed the qadi could initially restrict that jurisdic-
tion, either as to venue or as to the class of case to be heard.7"
Similarly, once given, jurisdiction could later be suspended or cur-
tailed. Collegial decision-making was prohibited in Islam-the judge
could consult a mufti (or legal scholar), but ultimately the judge alone
was accountable to the one who appointed him for the correctness of
the decision. 76 Putting these factors together, one can sense why, in the
69. The Mixed Courts of Egypt might be considered a fourth influence. Since the Mixed
Courts were basically influenced by French models, they have not been separately considered.
Because they were strongly supported by the capitulatory powers in Egypt, they did maintain an
independence from the government. On the subject of the Mixed Courts. see J. Brinton. The
Mixed Courts of Egypt (1968).
70. Khadduri & Liebesny, supra note 53, at 236.
71. Id. at 236-37.
72. W. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy 38 (1965).
73. Id.
74. Most often the ruler would appoint the more important qadis, who would in turn
subdelegate their jurisdictional authority to others. Khadduri & Liebesny, supra note S3, at 237.
75. Id. at 239.
76. Id. at 241-45.
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early Muslim legal model, there was a "complete lack of separation
between the judicial and executive powers."'77 Although the ruler could
not tamper with the substance of the Sharia-since he too was bound
by it-by the simple device of restricting the competence of the qadis
with respect to venue or subject matter, the ruler could effectively
achieve his goals without significant judicial interference. 78 Perhaps
the most sweeping statement of the supremacy of the political ruler
over the qadi occurred in the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth cen-
tury. The legal scholar Abul Su'ad broadly reformulated the principle
that the qadi was required to follow the Sultan's instructions in carry-
ing out the Sharia.79 Although at various times in Islamic history the
qadi did achieve some degree of autonomy from the ruler,80 generally
speaking, the power of the ruler to suspend the competence of the qadi
to hear certain classes of cases provided an effective veto over judicial
intervention in the political arena.
8 1
b. The British Tradition
If classical Islamic legal theory effectively made the qadi subservient
to the political branches of government, the arrival of British jurispru-
dence in Egypt did little to change this.
Although Egypt was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire,
Britain exercised a proconsular influence in the country after the year
1882.82 Unlike his American counterpart, however, the British judge
of the nineteenth century did not consider it his function to oppose the
will of the ruler-which in the British system of government was
Parliament. But that had not always been the case. During the seven-
teenth century in the famous Bonham's Case, Lord Coke had said:
And it appears in our books that in many cases the common law will controul Acts of
Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such act to be void .... "
But the doctrine of Bonham's Case was gradually abandoned as Par-
liament grew in power after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.84 Although
77. Id. at 239.
78. This device of restricting the competence of the Islamic courts has been used in the
twentieth century to "modernize" Islamic law. See N. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 172-81
(1964); N. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence 73-75 (1969).
79. J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 90 (1964).
80. Khadduri & Liebesny, supra note 53, at 240.
81. See note 78 supra.
82. 1 The Cambridge History of Islam 388 (P. Holt, A. Lambron & B. Lewis eds. 1970).
83. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652,8 Co. Rep. 114b, 11Sa(C.P. 1610) (footnote omitted).
84. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 337 (1956).
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clearly eroded by earlier eighteenth century decisions, 85 it was not until
1871 that the rule of Bonham's Case was categorically rejected. In
Lee v. Bude & Torrington Junction Ry., the court observed that
as to these Acts of Parliament ... they are the law of this land; and we do not sit here
as a court of appeal from Parliament .... We sit here as servants of the Queen and
the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by Parliament with the
consent of the Queen, lords and commons? I deny that any such authority exists.8 6
Thus, when the British occupied Egypt in 1882, English judges had
come to view their function as nothing more than servants of the
legislature.8 7
c. The French Tradition
Although aware of the British tradition both through schooling and
through the large numbers of British judges on the Mixed Courts of
Egypt,88 it was still the French, not the British, tradition which was
the more important European influence on the development of Egypt's
legal institutions. As one commentator remarked: "[Aifter forty years
of the British Occupation, British officials were administering French
law in Arabic, teaching French law in English, and arguing French
law in French ....- 89
The Code Napolon and post-revolutionary French judicial notions
became models for many institutions and aspects of Egyptian law. 90
Prior to the French Revolution, if a French parlement (court) disap-
proved of a royal ordinance, it could refuse to put the ordinance into
effect.9 1 The King could overcome judicial resistance only by appear-
ing personally in court.9 2 After the Revolution, however, judicial
independence was severely curtailed. Since law making was viewed as
85. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 58-59 (1926).
86. 6 C.P. 576, 582 (1871).
87. Parliament, to use a picturesque phrase, "could do anything except make a man a
woman." Plucknett, supra note 84, at 337. Paradoxically, the principle of parliamentary supre-
macy which resulted in the removal of judicial control over the validity of legislation in England,
had the opposite result in the American colonies. M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the
Contemporary World 40 (1971).
88. From 1875 until 1949, there were 9 judges from Great Britain on the Court of Appeals
and 23 in the District Courts. Only France had a larger number of judges in the Mixed Courts.
Brinton, supra note 69, at 231.
89. Id. at 87 n.4.
90. Id. at 86-87. See also B. Schwartz, The Code Napolion and the Common-Law World
101-02 (1956).
91. P. Herzog, Civil Procedure in France 44-45 (1967). The parlements developed from the
Parlement of Paris--a special section of the King's Council which began to sit especially to handle
judicial business. In time, local parlements were established throughout the country. Id. at 42-44.
92. Id. at 45.
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exclusively the prerogative of the popular assemblies, French courts
were forbidden to interfere with the legislative will. 93 There was a
"rigid separation of powers in which the judge, the passive and 'in-
animate' bouche de la loi, performed the sole task of applying the letter
of the law to individual cases-a task conceived as purely mechanical
and in no way creative." 94 Thus, judicial review in the American sense
of the word never developed in post-revolutionary France, the courts
being viewed as totally subservient to the legislature.
French judicial philosophy has not changed to the present day.
Under the 1958 Constitution, the judiciary is, in effect, an appendage
of the executive branch of government.9" In fact, the French Constitu-
tion does not even mention the judicial branch, speaking only of
judicial authority. 96 Carrying on the post-revolutionary tradition, the
Constitution does not give the French courts the power to review the
constitutionality of legislation. Constitutional review is made the func-
tion of a newly established Conseil Constitutionnel, a body com-
posed of nine members, three appointed by the executive and six by
the legislature. 97 For various reasons, however, the legislative review
provided by the Conseil is markedly different from what has tradition-
ally been understood by judicial review. 98 Thus, the French legal
tradition, like the British before it, did little to alter the traditional
Islamic view that the qadi or judge had no right to review the decrees
of the ruler. 99
93. Id. at 47.
94. Cappelletti, supra note 87, at 35.
95. Herzog, supra note 91, at 39.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 118. The Conseil is the first body in French history which has had the power to
declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional. Id. at ?5.
98. Cappelletti, supra note 87, at 4-6.
99. One commentator has argued that because of their professional training, the European
judges never developed the policy-oriented skills neces.ary for judicial review. Id. at 62-63.
The Mixed Courts of Egypt, however, did develop a form of constitutional review. Any decree
violating the capitulations would not be enforced in the Mixed Courts. Brinton, supra note 69, at
131. As a practical matter, however, a law, to be applicable to foreigners, had to be approved by
one of the two legislative branches of the Mixed Courts or by the capitulatory powers themselves.
Thus, it would be difficult to argue that a law violated the capitulations if the capitulatory powers
had already consented to it. See id. at 131-32.
There are hopeful signs, however, that the structure of the Egyptian judiciary may undergo a
significant transformation in the future. The 1971 Constitution of Egypt provides the framework
for a judiciary similar in many respects to the American model. Articles 165 and 166 state that the
judges and the judicial authority are independent. Articles 174 through 178 create a Supreme
Constitutional Court with power to review legislative acts.. Egyptian Const. arts. 165-66, 174-78,
reprinted in 26 Middle East J. 55, 67 (1972). The Supreme Constitutional Court must be watched
to see if it effectively exercises judicial review. For an argument that the Egyptian courts have a
tradition of independence, objectivity and fairness, see Goekjian, Specific Problems and Uniquc
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If the foregoing analysis is accepted, there appear to be important
differences between the American legal model and the Muslim legal
model. Because of its emphasis on the power of the ruler on the one
hand, and the relative weakness of constitutional and judicial re-
straints on the other, the Middle East legal model has fewer inherent
checks against arbitrary governmental action than does the American
model.1 00 If this comparative analysis were applied systematically to
every country in the world, one would undoubtedly find that this
increased potential for arbitrary government action exists in many
legal systems. It is now necessary to relate legal models with this
greater potential for arbitrary governmental action to the question of
foreign corporate payments.
B. Questionable Payments in Different Legal System Models
1. The Corrupt Motive
The legislation recently enacted by Congress criminalizes payments
made to foreign officials which are "corruptly" made. 10 1 The term "cor-
ruptly" implies a high degree of criminal purpose' 0 2-a purpose to
influence the foreign official to select the approach most favorable to the
payor from among the range of alternative approaches available to the
official. For the sake of argument, assume that on any given question a
foreign government official could make four different decisions-deci-
sion A, B, C, or D. Assume further that decision A would be totally
Aspects of Doing Business in Egypt, reprinted in Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the
Middle East-Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran 179, 187 (1977). and Habachy, Doing Business in
Egypt-Comments, reprinted in Current Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East-
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran 190, 191-92 (1977).
100. It must again be emphasized, however, that even within the overall Middle East model,
there will be significant variations from country to country.
In his dissent in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), Mr. Justice Rehnquist suggested that it
was not irrational to think that differences in the political and social structure of a foreign country
could adversely affect an alien's abilities to work within the American political and legal model.
"It is not irrational to assume that aliens as a class are not familiar with how we as individuals
treat others and how we expect 'government' to treat us. An alien who grew up in a country in
which political mores do not reject bribery or self-dealing to the same extent that our culture does;
in which an imperious bureaucracy historically adopted a complacent or contemptuous attitude
toward those it was supposed to serve; in which fewer if any checks existed on administrative
abuses; in which 'low-level' civil servants serve at the will of their superiors-could rationally be
thought not to be able to deal with the public and with citizen civil servants with the same
rapport [as] one familiar with our political and social mores .... " Id at 662 (Rehnquist. J
dissenting). It has been alleged that the judges at one recent trial in Pakistan were "very
submissive and obliging to the military Government." N.Y. Times, Mar. 20. 1978. § A. at 3. col
4; see id. Mar. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
101. See note 13 supra.
102. See note 24 supra.
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arbitrary-a decision based on no other ground than the whim of the
decisionmaker. Decisions B, C, and D on the other hand, are all
reasonable in terms of different governmental policy concerns. In the
American model, the courts and constitution would prohibit an official
from making decision A, but would not restrict his power of choice
among decisions B, C, or D. Thus, a payment made in the American
system would usually be "corruptly" made since its purpose would be
to influence the decisionmaker in his choice between alternatives B, C,
or D-a choice which should be based on policy concerns rather than
on personal greed. But, in a legal system where there are fewer
restraints imposed on the decisionmaker-restraints which would pre-
vent him from also choosing alternative A-is it as clear that a
payment made would reach the high degree of culpability necessary
before a payment can be found to be "corruptly" made?
Assume that an American company has an existing investment in a
certain South American country whose ruler is a dictator. The company
learns that the ruler of the country wishes to be paid money in return for
the continued goodwill of the government toward the company. The
failure to pay would result in harassment of the company; for example,
the arbitrary revocation of discretionary work permits for foreign em-
ployees or the refusal to permit the company to bid on future contracts. If
the payment is made, its purpose will have been to influence the acts of
the dictator; that is, to influence him not to act arbitrarily. If one of the
reasons for making a payment is to hedge against possible future arbitrary
action-action which cannot be effectively resisted in a foreign court-
has the payment been corruptly made? The legislative history of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it clear that under these conditions
the payment would be considered "corruptly" made because the corpora-
tion made a conscious decision to bribe. 103 Only payments made in true
extortion situations, a payment, for example, to an official to keep an oil
rig from being dynamited, would be considered not corruptly made-
presumably because a payment made under extreme duress cannot be
said to be corrupt. 10 4 But, in legal systems where there is a greater
potential for arbitrary government action, there would seem to be an
inherent coercive element present whenever a payment is requested,
whether implicitly or explicitly. Depending on the circumstances, this
coercive element might be sufficiently strong to negate the high degree of
culpability needed for a corrupt motive. 10 5
103. Senate Report, supra note 17, at 10-11.
104. Id. at 11.
105. The author does not mean to suggest that all payments made in these legal systems are
ipso facto "non-corrupt." Corrupt motives may be the prime reason for these payments even in a
legal system with a greater potential for arbitrary acdion.
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2. Compensating Mechanisms
If structural differences among legal systems may directly affect the
prosecutor's task of proving a corrupt motive under American law,
structural differences may create a wholly different set of problems for the
legislator. In a legal system where a foreign government is less restricted
by court and constitution, an American legislator may well ask whether
compensating mechanisms exist by which an American company, operat-
ing in a different legal system, can achieve protection against arbitrary
government action comparable to that afforded in the American system.
Several possible compensating mechanisms must be considered.
a. Insurance
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was created in
1969106 to "mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States
private capital and skills in the economic and social progress of
less developed friendly countries and areas .... ,1o'0 OPIC provides a
program which insures against: a) the inability of an American investor
to convert into dollars local currency received as earnings or profits or
return of its original investment; 08 b) loss of its investment due to
expropriation or confiscation;10 9 or c) loss of its investment due to war,
revolution or insurrection. 10 Since an American corporation is eligible
for any or all of these programs-no matter what the form of its
foreign investment might be-the existence of this insurance program
might provide a sufficient degree of property protection to obviate the
need for payments to government officials. The president of OPIC
made this point quite forcefully in testimony before the House Com-
mittee on International Relations. OPIC insurance, he argued,
will protect the U.S. investor who is the victim of extortion by a Government official who
threatens expropriation or some other sanction against him if he fails to make the
payment. It is a protection because the insured investor in that case knows that he can call
on OPIC and our insurance in the event that action is taken against him. II
Realistically, however, the existence of OPIC insurance has little prac-
tical impact on the question of whether or not to accede to a payment
request. First of all, OPIC does not provide complete insurance coverage.
OPIC usually insures only 90% of the investment and in some cases much
106. 83 Stat. 809 (1969) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2199 (1970)).
107. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970).
108. Id. § 2194(a)(1)(A).
109. Id. § 2194(a)(1)(B).
110. Id. § 2194(a)(1)(C).
111. Hearing and Markup Sessions of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Committee Hearings].
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less. 112 Second, OPIC will only insure investments in less developed
friendly countries 1 3 which have signed bilateral agreements with the
United States recognizing the United States' right of subrogation for any
claims paid by OPIC. 114 In the Middle East, such agreements exist with
Egypt, I15 Saudi Arabia, 116 Jordan, 117 Syria, 118 the Sudan, 19 Yemen, 120
Morocco,' 2  and Tunisia 22 but not with Algeria, Libya, Iraq, or Leba-
non. Even in countries where OPIC insurance is available, the pro-
posed project or investment requires two approvals-the approval of
the host country and the approval of OPIC. 123 Third, OPIC's approval is
not based solely on the economic strength or weakness of the project.
OPIC is required to scrutinize the project to see if the investment will
have a substantial negative effect on American employment or on the
United States balance of payments. 124 Similarly, OPIC must deny insur-
ance coverage to a project which is "likely to cause ... [the] investor...
significantly to reduce the number of his employees in the United States
[because] he is replacing his United States production with production
from such investment which involves substantially the same product for
substantially the same market as his United States production. ..."125 In
certain cases, these requirements could be significant limitations on the
112. OPIC's statute requires the insured company to provide for at least ten percent of the
insurance. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(f) (Supp. IV 1974). For large investments, OPIC will limit
expropriation coverage to seventy-five percent and often as. low as fifty percent. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Investment Insurance Handbook 8-9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Invest-
ment Insurance Handbook]; see 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
113. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970).
114. See id. § 2197(a).
115. [19631 14 U.S.T. 945, T.I.A.S. No. 5383, 479 U.N.T.S. 207.
116. [1975] 26 U.S.T. 459, T.I.A.S. No. 8045.
117. [19561 7 U.S.T. 2829, T.I.A.S. No. 3663. Jordan's agreement is typical of the others.
The United States agrees not to guarantee any project by American nationals in Jordan unless the
Jordanian Government first approves the project. Id. § 2. Also, if the United States Government
pays any money under the guaranty, any right, title, or interest in the project passes to the United
States Government and it becomes subrogated to any claim or cause of action. Id. § 3(a).
118. [1977] - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 8707.
119. [19591 10 U.S.T. 408, T.I.A.S. No. 4201, 342 U.N.T.S. 13.
120. [19721 24 U.S.T. 845, T.I.A.S. No. 7586.
121. [1961] 12 U.S.T. 386, T.I.A.S. No. 4728, 406 U.N.T.S. 249.
122. [1959] 10 U.S.T. 858, T.I.A.S. No. 4224, 344 U.N.T.S. 179, amended by [1963] 14
U.S.T. 385, T.I.A.S. No. 5329, 474 U.N.T.S. 344. The agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, and
the Sudan were all made under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. 22 U.S.C. § 1933(b)(4) (repealed
75 Stat. 460 (1961)). Even though the Act has been repealed, all guarantees made under it are still
valid. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(c) (1970).
123. OPIC's approval is required by statute. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970). The approval of the
host government is required by the agreement between the United States and the respective
government.
124. Id. § 2191(i) (Supp. IV 1974).
125. Id. § 2191(m)(1).
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availability of OPIC insurance. Fourth, there is at least some concern
expressed that OPIC, like the Securities and Exchange Commission
(S.E.C.), may be pressured into policing the corporate practices of its
clients. 126 The procuring of OPIC insurance would provide the United
States Government with a sufficient handle to inquire into many other
sensitive areas of a company's foreign business practices. 12 7 Fifth, alle-
gations have been made that OPIC often assumes a skeptical stance-
even against the grossest sort of foreign government action-and resists
the payment of large claims. 128 Such a policy stance, of course, seriously
undercuts OPIC's usefulness. Sixth, OPIC insurance does not protect the
on-going business profits of the investor while payments made to foreign
officials arguably do. Once a company is expropriated, or some foreign
government sanction is imposed on it, future profits are lost and not
compensated for by OPIC insurance. Since companies are in busi-
ness to make a profit, the questionable payment, rather than OPIC
insurance, may better protect this ongoing profitability of the company.
Seventh, although OPIC insures against expropriator), action, the
definition of that term excludes proper regulatory or revenue actions by
the foreign government. 129 Because government harassment just short of
expropriatory action can take so many forms, it may be difficult for a
corporation to prove that certain conduct is, in fact, expropriatory rather
than harassment or proper regulatory action. Eighth, in the standard
insurance contract used by OPIC, the investor must warrant that his
project is in conformity with all applicable laws of the project country
126. OPIC's president has testified that OPIC should not become a regulatory agency because
of its small staff and the congressional directive to make OPIC a largely private business. House
Committee Hearings, supra note 111, at 15. OPIC's vice-president has expressed a more general
concern. "I have my doubts whether we in this country can police the morality of the world ....
Also I would be very reluctant to get into that sort of situation because how would one determine
whether or not a bribe had been extorted from a U.S. investor? . . . Such a mechanism could
create very serious foreign relations problems by forcing the U.S. Government to take actions
which could be easily regarded as outrageous interference in the governmental affairs of a foreign
country." The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, Hearings before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the Comm,. on International Relations. House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House Subcommittee
Hearings].
127. For several such sensitive practices, see Report to the Shareholders of the General Tire &
Rubber Company, July 19, 1977, at 5-6.
128. In an effort to encourage investors and foreign governments to avoid nationalization by
resolving their own disputes, OPIC, in 1971, adopted a policy of setting claims instead of just
paying them and then asking Congress for more money. Gilbert, Expropriations and the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 515, 517 (1977). In cases where
negotiations fail, OPIC has been accused of trying to reduce its payment on the claim. Id. at 535.
129. Investment Insurance Handbook, supra note 112, at 10. This definition of expropriation
is not in OPIC's statute, but it is part of the standard OPIC contract. ld.
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that can be ascertained by reasonable investigation. 130 The contract
excludes losses resulting from provocation or instigation on the part of the
investor or from the lawful prosecution of illegal acts. 131 A comparative
legal systems analysis shows how confusing these contract provisions
really are. American companies may argue that quite often the statutes of
a country are unclear or that the statutes say one thing but the practice
says another. Is one in conformity with applicable laws if one follows the
unwritten as opposed to the written law of a country? Furthermore, what
does provocation or instigation on the part of the investor mean and from
what perspective are these questions to be judged? A corporate payment
might be considered a provocative act in the United States but totally
acceptable in a differently structured legal system. For these reasons,
OPIC insurance may not be a realistic compensating mechanism by
which an American company can achieve protection against arbitrary
government action.
b. Arbitration
Arbitration may, however, provide a more effective compensating
mechanism to curtail arbitrary foreign government action. For exam-
ple, in Egypt, under article 8 of Law No. 43 of 1974,132 an American
company can provide in advance for investment disputes to be settled
either by private arbitration mechanisms or within the framework of
any existing bilateral agreement between the countries or within the
framework of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States. 133 With any of
130. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 126, at 7.
131. Id. at 7-8.
132. Law No. 43, supra note 61, art. 8. For a detailed discussion of this statute, see
McLaughlin, Infitah in Egypt: An Appraisal of Egypt's Open Door Policy for Foreign Investment,
46 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (1978).
133. Under this last mentioned convention, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes makes provision for the creation of a Special Arbitral Tribunal as a
mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes. [1965] 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, ch. IV, § 2, art. 37(1). The Tribunal consists of any uneven
number of arbitrators, but if the opposing parties cannot agree on a number, each side can
appoint one arbitrator and a third will be appointed by agreement of the parties. Id., ch. IV, § 2,
art. 37(2)(b). There are problems with the effectiveness of this procedure, however. First, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes has jurisdiction over a matter only if
both parties agree in writing to submit their dispute to the Centre. Id., ch. 11, art. 25(1). Either
side can thus block resort to this form of arbitration. Second, even if both sides do agree to
arbitration, the final award must be enforced in a court designated by the state within which
execution is sought. Id., ch. IV, § 6, art. 54(3). Therefore, in a legal system such as the Middle
East, the arbitration procedure does not eliminate the problem of a non-independent judiciary.
In addition to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, there are two separate bilateral agreements between Egypt and the
United States which establish a framework for other forms of arbitration. First, there is a general
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these forms of arbitration, however, unless there is voluntary com-
pliance by the government, any arbitration decree must ultimately be
enforced in the courts of the foreign country. In a legal model where
the judiciary is less independent of the political branches of govern-
ment than in the American model, pressure may be exerted to render a
judgment favorable to the government. 134 Thus arbitration may not be
viewed as a sufficient compensating mechanism because its effective-
ness rests on the voluntary compliance of the foreign government-the
very thing that a compensating mechanism seeks to avoid.
c. The Local Agent
The local agent may represent a third form of compensating mecha-
nism against arbitrary government action. In most foreign countries,
the use of a local agent makes good business sense. In many areas of
the world, a Westerner is often viewed with inherent mistrust. Since
the agent is a national of the country, he can deal with his fellow
countrymen in their own language and with an understanding of the
rituals and customs of the local business practice. In addition, the
agent chosen will undoubtedly have substantial influence in the coun-
try: through either friendship, family or business ties, or perhaps even
through past government affiliation. The wisdom of using local agents
is supported by the practices of American companies. Lockheed, for
example, reported that between 1970 and 1975, it paid more than 150
consultants in fifty foreign countries approximately 165 million dollars
in fees. 135
In the Middle East legal model, where the ruler is virtually supreme
on the one hand and there exists a long history of extra-judicial
mediation on the other, 136 the use of local agents would seem to be
particularly beneficial. The local agent through his influence can
reconcile the company and the government if any dispute arises.
Although the laws of several Middle Eastern countries require the
arbitration agreement between Egypt and the United States which provides for submission of a
dispute to some competent tribunal such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 11
Bevans 1325, 47 Stat. 2130, T.S. No. 850, 142 L.N.T.S. 323 (1932). This agreement, however,
does not apply to disputes within the domestic jurisdiction of either country. Id. art. 11(a). The
second bilateral United States-Egyptian agreement on arbitration is contained in a provision in
the Investment Guaranties Treaty between the two countries. (19631 14 U.S.T. 945, T.I.A.S. No.
5383, 479 U.N.T.S. 207. This provision provides for the negotiation of any dispute and, if that
fails, for "binding" arbitration by a three-member panel.
134. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mfar. 20, 1978, § A, at 3, col. 4; id., Mfar. 25, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
135. Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors, Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, May 16, 1977, at 29.
136. See Patai, supra note 27, at 228.
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hiring of local agents, 137 on further analysis, the use of a local agent
does not appear to be a sufficient compensating mechanism for the
absence of strong constitutional or judicial protections against arbi-
trary government action. The agent, although technically representing
the foreign company, must in the end also serve the host govern-
ment. His usefulness as an agent depends upon his governmental
connections. If he antagonizes the government in representing his
principal, he will lose his influence and therefore also his future
effectiveness as an agent. Thus, from the standpoint of the foreign
principal, it must be realized that the agent cannot risk a rupture with
the government in settling a dispute. The agent will ultimately have to
bow to government decisions without strongly opposing them.
d. The Questionable Payment
If neither insurance, arbitration nor the local agent are adequate
compensating mechanisms for the lack of a strong judiciary and
constitutional guarantees in some legal systems, could the questionable
payment serve this function?1 38 If a hypothetical legal system provides
137. Kuwait, for example, requires the hiring of local agents before foreign companies may do
business in the country. Legal Aspects of Doing Business with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
Gulf States 273 (1975). If the agent is to be a corporation, Law No. 36 of 1964 (Kuwait) requires
at least fifty-one percent Kuwaiti ownership of such a company or firm operating as an agent in
the country. An Introduction to Business Law in the Middle East 80 (B. Russell ed. 1975). On
Iraqi law, see id. at 83. Iraq, by Law No. 208 of 1969 (Iraq), allows nationals of other Arab
countries, as well as Iraqis, to work as agents in Iraq, id. at 80, 83. In Egypt, sales agents for
foreign sellers must be either Egyptian nationals or an Egyptian company. See Current Legal
Aspects of Doing Business in the Middle East-Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran 195 (W.
Wickersham & B. Fishburne eds. 1977); Legal Aspects of Doing Business with Egypt, Iran, Saud
Arabia and the Gulf States 259 (1975). Certain Middle Eastern governments have recently taken
steps to deemphasize the importance of local agents. Iran, for example, forbids the payment of an
agent's fee to be included in the price of any American military equipment sold to the country.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this contract, any direct or indirect costs of agent's
fees/commissions for contractor sales agents involved in FMS [Foreign Military Sales] to the
Government of Iran shall be considered as an unallowable item of cost under this contract."
Defense Procurement Circular #117, Nov. 23, 1973, quoted in House Subcommittee tlearings,
supra note 126, at 102. Iran also requires affidavits from companies selling to the government
which state that no fees were paid to secure the contract Legal Aspects of Doing Business with
Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States 351, app. 11 (1975).
138. Quite often the local agent has been used as a conduit for the questionable payment. By
using the agent as the conduit for these payments, a company not only insulates itself from having
to make the payment directly but also can assure itself that the payment will reach the
appropriate person in the appropriate manner.
Local agents are paid by commission, usually expressed in terms of "points," i.e., a percentage
of sales. Although the points may vary, the fee can be quite substantial, permitting an agent to
keep a certain amount for himself, yet still have enough left over to buy continued future goodwill
for the company. An agent's percentage may be anywhere between the usual four to six percent
and the twenty-five percent obtained on smaller sales. The French and British are reportedly
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absolutely no restraints on the whims of the ruler, then obviously the
only protection offered within that system is the voluntary goodwill of
the ruler. If fair treatment by the ruler is either implicitly or explicitly
conditioned on payments being made, then the payment would appear
to compensate for the lack of any other method of assuring fair
treatment. (Again it must be emphasized that this does not mean that
taking advantage of the compensating mechanism would necessarily
make the payment moral.) But no legal system is as extreme as the
hypothetical posited above. In each country, the court system will be
more or less independent of the government, or constitutional protec-
tions will be more or less guaranteed. Even in the American model,
extreme circumstances have seen the dilution of constitutional guaran-
tees.13 9 This very variety poses the dilemma faced by the American
legislator in determining whether to criminalize questionable pay-
ments. Criminalization may be justified in countries where the legal
model is similar to that of the United States, but criminalization
becomes progressively less justifiable as a country's legal model has an
increasing potential for arbitrary action. Before criminalizing the mak-
ing of these payments everywhere and under all circumstances, the
legislator must be assured that an acceptable degree of protection
against arbitrary action exists for American companies in the structure
of all other foreign legal systems or through other available compensat-
ing mechanisms. Because this is an almost impossible task, it would
seem to have been more prudent for Congress to have refrained from
criminalizing the making of these payments-at least from the
perspective of this comparative legal systems analysis.
Before concluding Part II of this Article, however, two comparative
legal systems arguments supporting criminalization should be an-
swered. First, it could be argued in opposition to the conclusion just
set forth that Congress should criminalize payments wherever made
masters in dealing through agents. An agent for a European company had, at one time during
negotiations, twenty-one points (twenty-one percent) on a $200 million contract House Subcom-
mittee Hearings, supra note 126, at 102.
The position of local agent for foreign companies is obviously quite lucrative. In the past
twenty years, the principal shareholder of Triad Financial Establishment-a company which
represents many American interests in Saudi Arabia-has made a personal fortune of one
hundred million dollars. In addition, Triad itself-with business ventures -ranging from meat
packing in Brazil to a multi-million dollar agricultural scheme in the Sudan"-is estimated to
have assets of four hundred million dollars. Saudi Arabia's Super Salesman-Catching Up with
Rockefeller, Point, July 4, 1977, at 24. In one INddle Eastern deal, a French firm made forty
million dollars on a contract worth two to three hundred million dollars. See House Subcommit-
tee Hearings, supra note 126, at 102.
139. See, e.g., the post-,Vorld War I free speech cases of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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and, in those situations where, due to the increased potential for
arbitrary action, companies are explicitly or implicitly coerced into
making payments, allow the coercion to be introduced as exculpatory
evidence on the question of corrupt motive. Although seemingly an
appealing compromise, closer scrutiny reveals that this will result in
courts being asked to review the adequacy of a country's constitutional
guarantees, the relative independence of a country's judiciary and
other sensitive questions of foreign government conduct. Because, by
excluding the evidence, a judge may feel that he is assuring a convic-
tion for a serious offense, courts may strain to permit the evidence -to
be introduced, and this may have important, and not necessarily
beneficial, foreign policy implications.
Second, it could be argued that since bribery of government officials
is universally a crime, Congress should criminalize acts of an American
company which run counter to this criminal law policy of foreign
nations. Again taking the Middle East as a focus of comparison, it is
true that bribery of government officials is considered a crime. The
Penal Code of Egypt, for example, forbids a public official to solicit or
receive any promise or gift to do or to refrain from doing an act within
his jurisdiction. 140 Any violation of the law is punishable by a life
sentence at hard labor and a fine of not less than 1000 Egyptian
pounds but not more than the value of the promise or the gifts
received. 14 1 Saudi Arabian law also prohibits public officials from
soliciting or accepting bribes. 142 In addition, the Saudi law crim-
inalizes both payment of the bribe and acting as an intermediary
in a bribery transaction.143 Violations of the law are punishable by a
prison term of up to ten years or a fine not to exceed 20,000 rials. 14
4
The Kuwaiti statutes prohibit public officials from accepting or solicit-
ing bribes in exchange for the commission or omission of acts within
their jurisdiction. 145 The Kuwaiti statute defines public officials to
include officials, employees and workers belonging to the government
or under its supervision and control. 146 The law of Kuwait provides a
jail term of up to ten years for violations of the law. 147 Unlike the
Saudi law, in which the prison sentence and fine are stated in the
140. Penal Code of Egypt ch. III, art. 103(b).
141. Id.
142. Royal Decree No. 43 of June 16, 1958, art. II (Saudi Arabia).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Law No. 31 of 1970 arts. 35-43 (Kuwait) (amending Law No. 16 of 1960), reprinted in
Kuwait al Yawm, No. 787, July 26, 1970, at 6-12 [hereinafter cited as Law No. 31 (Kuwat)l.
146. Id. art. 43(a).
147. Id. art. 36.
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alternative, 148 Kuwait mandates a fine of double the amount given or
promised but not less than 50 Kuwaiti dinars in addition to the prison
term. 149 But existing side by side with these statutory proscriptions
against bribery is evidence of widespread questionable payments, few
investigations of their legalityS--even in instances where impor-
tant functionaries seemingly knew of their existence's'-and the rela-
tively muted reaction of Middle Eastern governments to the disclosure
of these payments. Two conclusions are possible from these facts: (1)
the exact parameters of these statutes may never have been tested and,
as a consequence, their scope is unclear;1 52 or (2) some form of
customary law preemption of the written law may have taken place. , 3
Congress would seem less justified in furthering the criminal law
policies of foreign nations when from the language of the bribery
statutes, it may not be clear that these policies are in fact implicated,
or when the foreign nations themselves seem apathetic towards enforc-
ing their own criminal law. Rather, Congress should prescind from
criminalizing these payments and, as an alternative, should encourage
the executive branch of government to lobby for increased enforcement
of foreign bribery laws by the foreign nations themselves. This would
have a most salutary effect. If questionable payments are in fact
compensating mechanisms for investment protection in certain legal
systems, by enforcing their existing bribery statutes, these nations
would be required to provide investment protections or risk losing
foreign investment. This could only enhance the strength of their
respective constitutional guarantees, the independence of their court
systems and the effectiveness of arbitration procedures.
I]I. AMERICAN REGULATORY LAWS
If a comparative legal systems analysis argues against outright
criminalization of foreign corporate payments, this same analysis may
also prove valuable in considering other American regulatory legisla-
tion in this field. At least five distinct sets of statutes relate to the
question of corporate payments made to foreign officials. The first set
148. Royal Decree No. 43 of June 16, 1958, arL II (Saudi Arabia).
149. Law No. 31 art. 35 (Kuwait).
150. In 1971, Morocco criminally prosecuted a local agent and four government officials for
receiving questionable foreign payments. Report to the Shareholders of the General Tire &
Rubber Company, July 19, 1977, at 7. There have been few prosecutions of American companies.
See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 126, at 25.
151. See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 26, at 847-53.
152. For example, do the statutes cover payments made to a government official to try to
influence an act not strictly within his jurisdiction? See text accompanying note 140 supra.
153. See generally Brinton, supra note 69. A custom or usage is important in the Arabic
World. In Egypt, "usage is law." Id. at 90. Usage can effectively modify the written law. Id.
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of statutes-federal and state bribery laws-by their very terms do not
specifically cover payments made abroad to foreign officials. Of the
four remaining sets, the first two-customs and securities laws--
regulate the disclosure of these payments, but not their making. With
respect to these laws, the lessons learned from the analysis in Part II
will have relevance in determining the extent of disclosure that should
be required. The final two groups of statutes-tax and antitrust
laws-directly regulate the making of these payments. The compara-
tive legal systems analysis will be relevant in determining whether
these payments should be permitted to reduce taxable income or earn-
ings and profits and whether they should be considered anticompetitive
acts.
A. Bribery Laws
Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits the
payment of anything of value to a "public official" to influence official
acts. 154 "Public official" is defined as a "Member of Congress ... or an
officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United
States, or any department, agency or branch . . . thereof . . .,.
Similarly, the bribery statute of the State of New York, which is
illustrative of state bribery statutes, prohibits payments made to public
servants defined as public officers or employees of the State of New
York.156 Thus, the language of both federal and state bribery statutes
is limited to bribes paid American, not foreign, officials.
Corporate contributions to foreign candidates or political parties also
seem beyond the scope of federal and state law. Section 441b of Title
2 of the United States Code forbids corporate political expenditures or
contributions but only in connection with United States presidential or
congressional elections.1 -7 Those state statutes which forbid or regu-
late corporate political contributions are limited to state elections.
Missouri, for example, prohibits any corporation wherever organized
from contributing to any political candidate.' 5 8 The wording of the
154. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970). Violators may be "fined not more than $20,000 or three times
the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more
than fifteen years, or both ..... Id. § 201(e).
155. Id. § 201(a).
156. N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(15) (McKinney 1975). The New York Penal Law makes it
unlawful for a "person" to bribe a public servant. Id. § 200.00. "Person" is defined as",a human
being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation . . . ." Id. § 10.00(7). For other
state bribery statutes, see, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A: 93-6 (West 1969); Va. Code § 18.2-447 (1975).
157. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S.
Apr. 26, 1978).
158. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 130.020(5) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Thirty-one states have enacted some
form of legislation restricting corporate political activity. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 46
U.S.L.W. 4371, 4381 n.1 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1978).
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statute, however, makes it clear that the prohibition extends only to
Missouri elections. Thus, both foreign bribery and foreign political
contributions seem beyond the reach of these federal and state bribery
statutes.
If federal and state bribery statutes do not cover the making of
questionable payments abroad, section 1952 of Title 18 of the United
States Code (the so-called "Travel Act") would also seem to have little
utility in this area. This section criminalizes travel in interstate or
foreign commerce or the use of any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce with intent to carry on any unlawful activity. 5 9 Unlawful
activity is defined to include bribery "in violation of the laws of the
State in which [it is] committed or of the United States.' 160 From the
legislative history of the Act, the word "bribery" clearly seems to mean
bribery of state, local, and federal officials, not of foreign government
officials. 16' If, however, the term "bribery" could be construed to
cover payments made to foreign officials, the statute still requires that
the bribery of the foreign official be "in violation of the laws of the
State in which committed or of the United States." At least before
passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, bribery of foreign
officials was not specifically criminalized by either state or federal
bribery statutes and hence the Travel Act was inapplicable. In order
for a prosecutor to have used the Travel Act successfully, he would
have had to argue: (a) that, contrary to the legislative history of the
section, the word "bribery" could be construed to include briber), of
foreign government officials, and (b) that the term "in violation of the
laws ... of the United States" meant "in violation of [any] of the laws
... of the United States." Since, it can cause anticompetitive effects in
the American market, foreign bribery could arguably violate the
antitrust laws. 162 Such a reading of the statute seems strained, how-
ever. But assuming that a prosecutor could convince a court that the
word "bribery" in the Travel Act does cover briber), of foreign
officials, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act could now be used in
conjunction with the Travel Act as an alternative basis for indictment.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). Mail fraud is forbidden by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), This
statute could conceivably be used by the Government to prosecute those companies that have
somehow involved the mails in their questionable activities. The difficulty with using this statute
is the requirement that it be shown that the payment defrauded someone. The shareholders of the
company might be shown to have been defrauded, but an argument that the citizens of the
foreign country have been defrauded by the corporate bribe paid to a foreign official seems
unsound. But see N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1978, at 53, col. 5, for a case where one company
pleaded guilty to such a charge.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1976).
161. See United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 50 n.9 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1977).
162. See pt. re(D) infra.
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B. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
Under section 1101 of Title 31 of the United States Code, a person
who knowingly transports over $5,000 in monetary instruments on
one occasion either out of, or into, the United States must file a report
with the United States Customs Service stating the amount, origin,
destination, and route of transportation of the money. 163 Monetary
instruments are defined to include, among other things, currency,
travelers' checks, money orders, and bearer negotiable instruments.
Order instruments without indorsements are not included within the
definition. Wilful failure to file the necessary report is punishable by a
$1,000 fine and/or imprisonment for not more than one year if the
amount of money involved is less than $100,000.164 For amounts over
$100,000, the penalty for wilful failure to report climbs to a fine of
$5,000 and a possible jail sentence of up to five years. 165 In addition,
the law authorizes the imposition of a civil penalty not to exceed the
amount of the money which should have been reported. 166 The regula-
tions promulgated under the Act, however, contain one important
exception. A transfer of funds through normal banking procedures
which does not involve physical transportation of the currency or
monetary instrument is not required to be reported.' 67
The United States Customs Service is reportedly investigating over
one hundred companies that are suspected of secretly transporting
money into or out of the United States from corporate slush funds.16 8
Some of this money may have been earmarked for making question-
able payments to foreign officials. One company and a bank have
already been fined for violating the Act's disclosure requirements,
although in both of these cases the money was not used to make
payments abroad. 169
The thrust of the Bank Secrecy Act is to permit the United States
Government to monitor the flow of money into and out of the country.
To justify disclosure of these money flows, the United States must
163. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1970).
164. Id. § 1058.
165. Id. § 1059.
166. Id. § 1103.
167. 31 C.F.R. 103.23 (1977).
168. Jensen, Customs Service Studies Company Cash Transfers, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1977,
at 41, col. 5. Among the companies under scrutiny are: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Northrop Corporation, Exxon Corporation, Ashland Oil Inc.,
and G.D. Searle and Company. Id.
169. The company in question was the Gulf Oil Corporation and the bank, the Chemical
Bank of New York. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1977, at 27, col. 6. For a Bank Secrecy Act
indictment against Deak & Company of California, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, § D, at 3, col.
5. In that case, money was smuggled into the United States. Id.
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demonstrate that a genuine need for the information exists and that the
extent of the disclosure has a reasonable relation to the demonstrated
need. In this context, the need for the information is easily demon-
strated. The monitoring of international money transactions can be
critical in successful narcotics enforcement 170 and in unearthing illicit
slush funds. Similarly, in an era of volatile money markets, interna-
tional money flows can provide the Department of the Treasury with
valuable fiscal data. In the light of these needs, the extent of the
disclosure required seems reasonable. The origin and destination of the
funds are directly related to the national interest in interrupting the
narcotics traffic, to cite but one example. To require an American
company to disclose cash movements in excess of $5,000-no matter
what their destination-would not seem unjustified under these cir-
cumstances.
C. Securities Laws
American securities legislation does not prohibit the making of pay-
ments to foreign government officials; it may, however, require their
disclosure under appropriate circumstances. However, unlike the need
for disclosure under the Bank Secrecy Act-a need which directly
relates to the furtherance of the national interest-the need for disclo-
sure of foreign payments under the securities laws rests on a weaker
foundation.
Whether information must be disclosed under the securities laws
depends upon whether that information is considered "material." Ma-
terial information has been defined as matter about "which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing
the security registered. ' 17 1 The traditional theory has been that the
reasonably prudent investor will wish to be kept apprised of those
matters which directly affect his investment, that is, financially, as
opposed to ethically, material information. In determining whether
170. The Bank Secrecy Act was originally enacted as a weapon against international drug
traffic. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1977, at 27, col. 6.
171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1977). The term "material" is not defined in either the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "material" has, however, been
defined generally in regulations. See, e.g., id. Recently in construing rule 14a-9, promulgated under
§ 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which deals with proxy solicitations, the Supreme
Court adopted a narrow definition of "materiality." An omitted fact in a proxy Solicitation is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would-not might-
consider it important in deciding how to vote. The definition contemplates a showing of
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the reasonable shareholder's deliberations. TSC Indus. Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444-49 (1976). The broader definition of materiality in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) seemingly has been rejected.
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corporate payments should be treated as material for disclosure pur-
poses, the comparative legal systems analysis of Part II should be
considered.
One justification offered in defense of corporate bribery disclosure is
that the payments may reflect on the integrity of company manage-
ment. 172 If, however, corporate payments in some legal systems act as
compensating mechanisms for the lack of other forms of investment
guarantees, then, under these circumstances, the making of such pay-
ments might not reflect as badly upon management. It has also been
suggested that corporate bribery indicates a weak competitive position
for the corporation and consequently requires disclosure. 173 But corpo-
rate payments in some countries may be considered more as a hedge
against potential arbitrary governmental action, rather than as a sign
of a weak competitive position. If anything, the payment of bribes
might "be a misleading indicator of [a company's] ability to compete
since the extent to which . . . competitors engage in the practice" is
unknown. 174 Finally, it has been argued that questionable foreign
payments are material because they expose the corporation to contin-
gent liabilities such as foreign criminal prosecution or expropriation. 175
But this argument is perhaps somewhat overstated. In some areas of
the world, 176 the relative scarcity of prosecutions seems to indicate that
no matter what the letter of the law, the payment may be acceptable in
a customary law sense, if not in a statutory law sense. 177 If anything,
the disclosure of the payments in the United States might force a
foreign government to take action to maintain a certain image of itself
in the eyes of the rest of the world.
Beyond the question of whether questionable corporate payments
should be considered financially material for disclosure purposes lies
perhaps an even more important aspect of SEC policy. Generally,
the SEC has requested companies to file undertakings pledging to
end future payments. 178 If the conclusions reached in Part II of this
Article are accepted, the SEC should carefully consider the conse-
quences of this policy. Requiring "declarations of cessation," may force
American companiesto operate without the benefit of any compensat-
172. Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities
Acts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1848, 1857 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure]. On the question of
what is material, see also Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements,
74 Mich. L. Rev. 1222 (1976).
173. Disclosure, supra note 172, at 1859.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1860.
176. See note 150 supra.
177. Even in the United States, certain statutes are often invalid indicators of community
values. See Disclosure, supra note 172, at 1858 n.65.
178. See id. at 1851, 1861.
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ing mechanism against arbitrary government action in a legal system
whose very structure creates a greater potential for such arbitrary
governmental action.
In deciding such issues, flexible and informed decision-making is
required of the SEC. Some disclosure of these payments seems jus-
tified, but the extent of that disclosure will be the crucial determina-
tion. Perhaps considerations akin to those presented in this Article
have already influenced the SEC to adopt a general policy of not
requiring identification of the recipient of the bribe even when the
payment is deemed material. 179
D. The Antitrust Laws
Unlike the customs and securities laws, the antitrust laws apply
directly to the making, and not merely to the disclosure, of foreign
corporate payments.18 0 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combi-
nations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, while section 2 prohibits
monopolization, and attempts and conspiracies to monopolize inter-
state and foreign commerce.t81 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act forbids unfair methods of competition and unfair trade
practices in or affecting foreign as well as interstate commerce. 182
Finally, section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits payments in
connection with a sales transaction except for services rendered. 183 If
these provisions could be given extraterritorial application, a bribe
paid to a foreign official by a seller could conceivably violate all three
of these statutes.
Although the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act is arguably much
narrower than that of the other acts, t8 4 there is general agreement that
the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts will be given ex-
traterritorial effect.18S In order for the legislation to extend to conduct
179. Report of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 1, at 20.
180. For a more complete analysis of the antitrust considerations with respect to foreign
payments, see Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United States Corporate Payments to
Foreign Officials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act and Sections I and 2
of the Sherman Act, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 131 (1977). See also B. Hawk, International Antitrust
(1978) (in manuscript).
181. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
182. Id. § 52.
183. Id. § 13(c).
184. See Rill & Frank, supra note 180, at 133-37.
185. On the extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act, see generally Rill & Frank,
supra note 180. For the possible extraterritorial use of the Federal Trade Commission Act, see
wall Street J., Oct. 18, 1977, at 2, col. 3. See also, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.Zd 416
(2d Cir. 1945).
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in a foreign country, however, a showing must be made that, at the
least, the foreign conduct had the requisite effect on United States
interstate or foreign commerce. For example, if a foreign bribe paid by
an American company reduced the chances of a second American
company to export its products or acquire part of a foreign market, the
necessary showing would presumably be made. However, the antitrust
laws recognize certain defenses to otherwise anticompetitive conduct.
To determine the scope of these defenses, the comparative legal sys-
tems analysis of Part II would seem of particular significance.
1. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine "foreclos[es] court adjudications involving
the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might
embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of
our foreign relations."'1 86 Although the act of state defense is usually
claimed by the foreign sovereign, private parties can rely on the
defense when their rights are based on, or derived from, an act of the
foreign state. 187 The recent Second Circuit case of Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,188 demonstrates how the act of state doctrine might be
utilized by an American company induced to pay a bribe by a foreign
government official. The majority in Hunt found that in order to state
an antitrust claim for conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
plaintiffs would be required to establish that but for the defendant's
conspiracy, Libya would not have nationalized plaintiff's assets. The
court reasoned that in order to establish this causal nexus, the court
would be forced to inquire into the acts and conduct of the Libyan
Government-an inquiry foreclosed by the act of state doctrine. 189 This
same reasoning might apply if an antitrust prosecution were predicated
on the paying of foreign bribes. In order to establish an anticompeti-
tive effect in the American market, a showing would have to be made
that the foreign government's act in granting a contract or a license
was in fact causally linked to the bribe. This inquiry into the motiva-
tion of a government's act may be foreclosed by the reasoning in Hunt.
To counter the Hunt reasoning, one could argue that unlike the
formal Libyan nationalization in Hunt, a bribe request by a govern-
ment official is not an act of state since it is not made pursuant to a
formal governmental decree or statute. 190 In Alfred Dunhill of London,
186. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976).
187. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 41(3) (1965).
188. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 608 (1977).
189. Id. at 76.
190. Appellants in Hunt emphasized that the lower court noted that the recent disclosures of
bribes and payoffs by multinational corporations to foreign officials warranted consideration of
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Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 191 a majority of the Supreme Court seem-
ingly required the existence of such a formal decree or statute before
the act of state doctrine could apply. 192 Justice Marshall, however, in
writing for three other Justices in dissent, argued forcefully against this
requirement:
While it is true that an act of state generally takes the form of an executive or
legislative step formalized in a decree or measure . . . that is only because duly
constituted governments generally act through formal means. When they do not, their
acts are no less the acts of a state, and the doctrine, being a practical one, is no less
applicable.193
When one considers that in some legal systems customary law may in
fact preempt statutory law, Justice Marshall's approach seems more in
line with the policies underlying the act of state doctrine. If the
purpose of the doctrine is to reduce possible judicial interference with
the executive's conduct of foreign relations, 194 judicial scrutiny of the
customary law acts of a foreign government may involve as much a
potential for interference as judicial scrutiny of the statutory law acts
of a foreign government.
2. The Defense of Foreign Compulsion
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 195 the
district court recognized that compulsion by a foreign government can
constitute a justification for anticompetitive acts. 196 The rationale
stems from the fact that when a foreign nation compels a trade prac-
tice, the act becomes in effect not the act of the corporation, but of the
foreign nation. The Sherman Act extends only to the trade practices of
persons or corporations, not to the trade practices of foreign countries.
In order to assess the relevance of the foreign compulsion defense to
corporate payments made to government officials in a country whose
the public interest in the continued viability of the act of state doctrine. The Second Circuit
refused to reach the issue because there was no allegation that representatives of the Libyan
Government "were seduced or enticed in any manner by the payment of bribes or boodle to take
the action complained about." 550 F.2d at 79. Thus, until a court reassesses the act of state
doctrine in light of the problems presented by questionable payments, the argument presented in
the text is not foreclosed. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Dunhill has not definitively ruled that
the act of state doctrine is unavailable with respect to purely commercial acts of a sovereign.
191. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
192. "Seemingly" is used because Mr. Justice Stevens seems to agree with the majority
opinion that a formal decree or statute must exist before the act of state doctrine can be claimed.
Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 718-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
194. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
195. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
196. Id. at 1298.
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legal model is different from that of the United States, assume the
following hypothetical situation. American company X has a substan-
tial investment in country Y. Assume also that a certain minister or
government official intimates that the renewal of certain important
licenses is contingent upon money payments being made. The clear
import of the suggestion is that without the payments there will be no
license renewal. Even if the payment could be shown to have anticom-
petitive effects in the United States, the company may try to justify the
payment on the grounds of foreign compulsion.
One commentator has remarked that while direct foreign govern-
ment compulsion, in the form of a statute or decree, is recognized as a
defense: "[t]he law is less clear in regard to conduct which is requested
or induced by foreign officials.' 197 In order to determine whether
informal governmental pressure in a legal system where there is a
significant potential for arbitrary action should constitute foreign com-
pulsion, a more detailed analysis of the foreign compulsion defense is
required. The Justice Department has highlighted five separate aspects
to this foreign compulsion defense.' 98 First, the actions compelled
must have taken place within the territory of the foreign nation, not
within the United States. Second, the corporation must be reasonable
in doing what it felt it had to do. Third, the act of compulsion on
which the defense is based must be the act of a sovereign entity acting
within the scope of its national powers. Fourth, international comity
interests must be balanced in deciding whether to treat the act as
compelled by the foreign government. Finally, the act of compulsion
alleged must relate not to the commercial actions of the foreign gov-
ernment, but only to its public, governmental actions.
Technically of course the payment request by the foreign govern-
ment official .does not meet these five requirements of the foreign
compulsion defense. While the act allegedly compelled-the question-
able payment-is limited to the territory of the foreign nation and
might arguably be viewed as reasonable conduct, particularly in a
country without a truly independent judiciary and meaningful con-
stitutional protections against arbitrary government action, the pay-
ment would still not meet the final three requirements. But on closer
analysis, an argument can be advanced that the payment does meet
these three requirements, if not precisely, at least closely enough to
permit the defense.
197. Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying Cooperation, 84 Yale
L.J. 268, 282 (1974).
198. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations Case L, reprinted in
[1977] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) E-15 to E-16 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Guide].
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a. The Need for a Government Decree
To accede to a bribe request from a foreign government official is
not comparable to acceding to conduct mandated by a foreign decree
or some other form of duly constituted government action. If anything
the letter of the foreign law may actually prohibit the making of these
payments. 199 But on the other hand, acceding to the bribe request is
not comparable to acceding to the actions of someone who lacks the
power to instigate arbitrary action. 200 The bribe request from the
government official falls somewhere in between these polar points. In a
legal system where the statutory forms of the law may not always
mirror accepted practices and where the ability to resist arbitrary
action is limited, too much emphasis should not be placed on the
absense of a formal decree. The fact that alternative means of invest-
ment protection may not be available should constitute the bribe
request as a form of governmental compulsion sufficient to recognize
the defense.
This analysis of course seems to contradict the Supreme Court's
holding in Dunhill that at least in the case of the act of state doctrine,
a formal governmental decree or statute is required to trigger the
defense. 201 But the two defenses (i.e. act of state and foreign compul-
sion) should be kept distinct. The foreign compulsion defense cannot
be claimed by a foreign government; it is the defense of the person or
company compelled to do something by the foreign government. The
litmus test of the defense should be the degree of the compulsion, not
the form of the compulsion. From the perspective of the company, it
makes little difference whether pressure is exerted by formal decree or
statute or by some informal customary practice. Since the company
cannot dictate how a government will act, either through formal or
informal means, the availability of the defense should not hinge on the
method of action chosen by the government.
b. International Comity202
Recognizing the foreign compulsion defense would not seem to vio-
late international comity, either from the perspective of the foreign
199. See notes 140-49 supra and accompanying text.
200. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 198, at Case L.
201. 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
202. For a discussion of the considerations that affect an international comity analysis, see
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40 (1965).
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nation or even from the perspective of the United States. Assume a
situation where either the bribery statute of country X is unclear or the
lack of bribery prosecutions suggests that the customary law of the
country tolerates corporate payments. Assume also that by making the
payment, American corporation A keeps its exclusive export market in
country X, a market to which American corporation B might otherwise
obtain access. The customary law of country X directs one thing, the
antitrust law of the United States directs another-namely to refrain
from engaging in anticompetitive acts affecting the American export
market. Where the laws of two countries conflict, comity requires a
balancing of the respective national interests.20 3 The interest of the
United States in furthering its antitrust policies becomes increasingly
weak as the effect of the act on the American market becomes more
and more remote. Since the conduct in question takes place almost
exclusively within the territory of country X and within the accepted
parameters of customary law, the interests of country X might be at
least as strong as the interests of the United States. Unless the pay-
ments can be made, American corporations, realizing the lack of other
available protections against arbitrary government action in that legal
system, may curtail their investments in the country. In effecting this
balance, it would not seem inappropriate to consider also the plight of
the American company not permitted to use this defense. 204 Without
it, the American company will be forced to the Hobson's choice of
either violating United States law or perhaps foregoing the limited
investment security available in another legal system. Balancing the
interests of the company and the respective interests of the countries
concerned, it is not so clear that comity would require American
antitrust principles to prevail.
c. Commercial Versus Governmental Acts
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice argues that the
availability of the foreign compulsion and act of state defenses should
turn on whether the act of the foreign state was governmental or
commercial in nature.20 5 If the act was governmental, the defense
applies; if commercial, the defense does not apply. The position of the
Antitrust Division seems wrong for several reasons. First, the Dunhill
203. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 198, at Case L.
204. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40(b) (1965).
205. Antitrust Guide, supra note 198, at Case L.
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Court was split evenly on the question of whether the act of state
defense applies to the commercial acts of a sovereign.2 0 6 Mr. Justice
Stevens expressed no opinion on this point. 207 Thus it is not clear that
Dunhill makes the commercial versus governmental act dichotomy a
controlling distinction. Second, even if the distinction is accepted in act
of state cases like Dunhill, there are policy reasons against extending
the distinction to foreign compulsion cases. The purpose of the act of
state doctrine is to reduce judicial interference in the executive's
handling of foreign affairs. When the potential for such interference is
small as in the case of judicial review of the commercial acts of
a foreign government, the defense may be rejected. But the
governmental-commercial distinction makes little sense in foreign
compulsion cases where the defense is based on coercion. If a foreign
official requests a bribe, whether in relation to the performance of a
governmental or commercial act, the degree of compulsion is the same.
Even if a court held that the foreign compulsion defense did not apply
to the commercial acts of a foreign government, it would be difficult to
make precise distinctions in this area.2 0 8 Many of the acts for which a
bribe might be requested are not easily classified as either governmen-
tal or commercial. For example, the renewal of an export or import
license, exchange control permissions, and the grant of working per-
mits for foreign employees would all seem to be governmental acts.
Less clear, however, would be the decision to buy one type of military
aircraft over another.
3. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noer -Pennington doctrine2 0 9 immunizes from antitrust attack
activities aimed at the solicitation of governmental action with respect
to the passage, enforcement and administration of laws, even if the
purpose of the solicitation was anticompetitive in nature and accom-
panied by deception of public officials. The doctrine is based in part on
the constitutional right of petition2 10 and as a consequence, one court has
206. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
207. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. The Antitrust Division itself recognizes this. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 198, at
E-15 n.98.
209. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
210. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127. 138
(1961). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been applied to dealings with the legislature, see
Noerr, supra, the executive, see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and
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stated in dictum that the doctrine does not apply readily to petitioning
foreign governments.2 1 The Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, however, has taken a contrary position, arguing "that private
representations to a foreign government leading to action of that gov-
ernment restraining United States foreign commerce is within the
protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. ' ' 2 12 If an American com-
pany bribes a foreign official to encourage the enactment of a govern-
ment regulation which would adversely affect other American com-
panies, could such conduct be protected by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine? Relying on dictum in California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unltd.2 13 and a number of lower court decisions, "the
Antitrust Division has noted that the Noerr-Pennington defense may
not apply where the representations are accompanied by bribery. '2 14
The legality of the payment under the applicable foreign law would
seem to be a determinative factor, since the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine, although it may protect deliberate deception, should not be
extended to protect illegal conduct. But often the bribery laws of a
foreign country may be unclear. Even when clear, by accepting the
distinction between what is formally legal and what is accepted by
custom, a company may try to argue that in a practical sense bribery
should be considered at worst unethical, but not illegal, conduct.
E. Tax Laws
The last set of statutes that relate to the legality of foreign corporate
payments are the tax laws. Before 1958, the deductibility of question-
able foreign payments made by corporations was generally regulated by
case law. 21t Even though such payments might arguably have been
the courts, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1973). Similarly, tile
doctrine has been extended to dealings with administrative agencies, the fourth branch of
government. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 08, 513 (1972).
211. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (dictum), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
212. Report of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 1, at 25; Antitrust Guide, supra
note 198, at Case N.
213. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The lower court decisions are: Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1972); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers,
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
214. Report of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 1, at 25.
215. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders
7-19 n.34 (1971).
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considered "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, the courts
consistently held that illegal payments were non-deductible because
they frustrated public policy. 21 6 In 1958, Congress amended section
162 of the Internal Revenue Code2 1 7 to reflect this "frustration of
public policy" approach taken by the courts. The language of the
amendment prohibited the deduction of payments made to an official
or an employee of a foreign government where such payments would
have been unlawful under the laws of the United States had such laws
applied. 218 Although the phrase "payment made, directly or indirectly,
to an official . . . of a foreign country" was not defined in the statute,
the language seemed sufficiently broad to encompass most forms of
these payments. 21 9 Furthermore, the regulations make it clear that
such payments would be disallowed even though the payments were
legal under the law of the country where they were made.220 This
provision of course concerns not the legality under American law of
payments made to foreign officials, but their deductibility in comput-
ing taxable income. As long as these payments were not deducted in
arriving at taxable income, there is no violation of section 162.
Of course, an extreme reading of the comparative analysis developed
in this article could be used to challenge the Internal Revenue Code's
position as to the deductibility of foreign corporate payments in arriv-
ing at taxable income. Since in certain legal systems, these payments
may sometimes be a form of compensating mechanism against arbi-
trary government action, they might be justified as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. But because many of these payments, even
in such legal systems, may not be inspired by investment-protection
motives, it may be justifiable to disallow all such payments from an
216. Id.
217. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 5(a, 72 Stat. 1608 t1958).
218. I.R-C. § 162(c)(1). For a reference to an Internal Revenue Service inquiry into the
foreign payments practices of one company, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1978, § D, at 1. col. 2.
219. In 1969, § 162(c) was further amended to read: "(c) Illegal bribes, kickbacks and other
payments.--(1) Illegal payments to government officials or employees.-No deduction shall be
allowed under subsection (a) for any payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official or
employee of any government, or of any agency or instrumentality of any government, if the
payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the payment is to an official or employee of
a foreign government, the payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if such
laws were applicable to such payment and to such official or employee. The burden of proof in
respect of the issue, for the purposes of this paragraph, as to whether a payment constitutes an
illegal bribe or kickback (or would be unlawful under the laws of the United States) shall be upon
the Secretary to the same extent as he bears the burden of proof under section 7454 (concerning
the burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud)." I.R.C. § 162(tc.
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(ii) (1970).
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administrative standpoint. If the rule were otherwise, there would be
the possibility that some corrupt payments would be used successfully
to reduce taxable income, thus permitting a corrupt payment to have a
direct and immediate effect on the revenues collected.
But it is not as clear that the same administrative rule should prevail
where taking account of these payments would not have as immediate
and direct an effect on the amount of revenues collected. Under these
circumstances, there would seem to be room to balance other consid-
erations in fashioning the applicable rule. Earnings and profits is an
accounting concept which determines whether a corporate distribution
is a dividend which is taxable income to the shareholder or a return of
capital which reduces the shareholder's basis in his stock.22' In certain
situations a payment which cannot be deducted in determining taxable
income can be deducted in computing earnings and profits.222 Penal-
ties for tax fraud are one such item.2 2 3 In determining earnings and
profits, it is less clear how foreign payments should be treated. From a
purely accounting standpoint, it makes sense to reduce earnings and
profits by the amount of the questionable payments in order to picture
accurately the economic position of the company. But, by permitting
an American parent company to reduce earnings and profits, there
could be an indirect reduction in the amount of tax revenue collected.
When earnings and profits are reduced, the amount taxed as a divi-
dend on distribution may similarly be reduced. Thus, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) may lose potential revenue because there will
be less taxable dividends distributed to the shareholders. Although as a
practical matter most large companies often carry forward enough
retained earnings and profits to make all distributions dividends, is the
theoretical possibility of reduced tax revenue sufficiently strong to
outweigh the definite accounting advantages in permitting the reduc-
tion of earnings and profits? If American public policy of a non-tax
nature was frustrated by permitting the reduction, the answer to the
question might be yes. But the various non-tax policies at stake are not
clearly thwarted by permitting the reduction. It could be argued, for
example, that foreign corporate payments could lead to confrontations
between the United States and foreign nations. In countries where
prosecutions for these payments have been rare, 224 the chance for
221. Bittker & Eustice, supra note 215, at 7-9 to 7-20.
222. Id. at 7-18 to 7-20.
223. Rev. Rul. 57-332, 1957-2 C.B. 231. But see Bernstein v. United States, 234 F.Zd 475
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 915 (1956).
224. See note 150 supra.
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serious confrontation seems unlikely. If the argument is made that the
United States should disallow the earnings and profits reduction on
moral grounds, on the theory that these payments ultimately corrupt
the maker as well as the recipient, one should recall that a "corrupt"
motive may not be the only reason for making these payments in other
legal systems. Similarly, although questionable payments to foreign
officials may spawn slush funds or other unethical corporate practices,
permitting the reduction might disclose these practices faster than a
rule which does not permit the reduction.
In Revenue Ruling 77-442, the IRS has agreed that at least as to
payments made to foreign government officials before November 3,
1976, earnings and profits can be reduced by the amount of the
payments, both for the American parent corporation and for any of its
foreign subsidiaries. 2 25 But, because of a 1976 amendment to section
964(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,2 26 the rule has been changed for
foreign subsidiaries of American parent corporations, at least with
respect to computing the earnings and profits of these foreign sub-
sidiaries for purposes of subpart F, part III, subchapter N, chapter I
of the Code. Presumably, in all other circumstances, earnings and
profits can still be reduced by the amount of any questionable pay-
ments. For the reasons stated above, the amendment to section 964(a)
does not seem a wise decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has not been written as a definitive answer to the
question of how Congress should regulate the serious problem of
foreign questionable payments. Rather, it has been written to sharpen
the focus on only one aspect of the problem: the comparative law
considerations raised by criminalizing these questionable payments.
Because of the seeming dissimilarities that exist between the American
legal model and those legal models that exist in certain other areas of
the world, this Article has argued against criminalization. Perhaps the
regulatory controls that existed prior to passage of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, if carefully and judiciously enforced, may better serve
the American national interest. But by emphasizing only one aspect of
the problem, this Article has necessarily prescinded from a discussion
of those other policy reasons supporting criminalization of foreign
225. Rev. Rul. 77-442, 1977-48 I.R.B. 10.
226. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1065(b), 90 Stat. 1654 (1976) (codified at
I.R.C. § 964(a)).
1978] 1113
1114 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
payments. The most critical of these other policy reasons is, of course,
morality. It is clear that these payments, if made in the United States
would be both illegal and morally repugnant to the vast majority of
Americans. Whether these moral standards should, by statute, be
given extraterritorial application to Americans living and working in
divergent cultures is a question with strong jurisprudential overtones.
In the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Congress itselt grappled with
this problem and made something of an accommodation, by deciding
to criminalize outright bribes but not the so-called "grease" payments.
The question of whether, or to what extent, an accommodation should
be made to different cultures will undoubtedly spawn an interesting
body of jurisprudential literature.
